Abstract. Electronic mail (e-mail) has been used to transfer various types of electronic data in Internet. Usually, a user has to send an e-mail to a specific group of users with a secure delivery mechanism. In this paper, a novel and feasible e-mail delivery mechanism using the secure multicast protocol with an ID-based factorial number structure (FNS) is proposed in the multicast system. In the proposed e-mail delivery mechanism, the e-mail is required to be encrypted before sending out in order to safeguard the message via a public channel, such as wire public switching communication links and wireless communication systems. Without loss generality, the public-key system is adopted in the proposed secure multicast system for a convenient and easy key management. The proposed scheme outperforms the existing methods for more easily to construct secure email system. Furthermore, the security of the proposed scheme is analyzed, including replay attack, sender impersonation attack, unknown key-share attack, forgery attack and insider attack. Finally, the computation complexities of the proposed mechanism are discussed. The result shows that the proposed scheme outperforms the CRT-based secure e-mail scheme.
Introduction
People widely use electronic mails (e-mails) to communicate with each other in Internet.
Delivering an e-mail in Internet, people could exchange not only normal text-based letter, but also sensitive rich electronic files. Because of the popularity, e-mail systems become an adversary's or a malicious user's targets. Among the e-mail security issues, basic and primary concerns are the confidentiality and authentication for the e-mails [1] .
Some data cryptosystems [2] can satisfy those concerns. Users can utilize a specific interactive key to encrypt and to verify their e-mails. However, the e-mail system is a kind of store-and-forward system in which e-mail servers act as a proxy to accept, forward, and store users' e-mails. User does not need continuously on-line to connect with an e-mail server. When a user wants to get the emails that are received and stored in the server, he/she has to access the email server first. For example, sender B intends to send an e-mail to receiver A . Sender B firstly sends the e-mail to the mail server A . Obviously, e-mail users are not always on-line. However, the e-mail users could not exchange the session key in time within a secure on-line system. To solve this difficulty, there are several challenges, such as authentication and secure key distribution [2] , to mail server. Public key systems could provide a solution but need much time to deal with encrypt or decrypt. The hybrid cryptosystems to prevent the high computation is also provided [3] . Another more efficient solution is provided by Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) protocol.
PGP was designed and implemented for distributed networks in 1991. It is a wellknown secure e-mail protocol that provides confidential data between senders and receivers. It is available on almost any platform which aims to be used within existing email systems [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] . PGP protocol [8] utilizes the idea in the hybrid cryptosystems to securely transfer a session key to both of the corresponding sender and receiver. A sender in the PGP system is given a certificated public key. The certificated public key can be applied to a secure channel to transfer the session key within the session key is used for encrypting the emails between the sender and the receiver. A user cannot verify the validity of PGP keys for each other. However, under many circumstances, a sender needs to send a single email to each other. Hence, how to transfer a session key to multi-receivers is a challenge for securing e-mail systems. Hung-Min Sun et.al. [9] proposed two novel e-mail protocols to provide a perfect forward secrecy. The basic protection in an e-mail system is to encrypt the bulk mail using a conventional cryptosystem with a short-term key and to protect the short-term key using a public-key cryptosystem with the receiver's public key. Amna Joyia, et.al. [10] found that an attacker can easily track from email header which are normally transported in clear text. Furthermore, this information can be manipulated for malicious purposes like sending spam messages to the extracted user identities, analyzing traffic to extract the behavior of both sender and receiver. All these attacks lead to vivid threat to the user's privacy. Then, he designed and implemented a secure and privacy enhanced email system which provided the solution to ensure the privacy of e-mail users. However, in the multicasting system, it uses PGP scheme to send e-mail for lots of specific receivers. It has to send the e-mail one-by-one. For example, as a user usually needs to send an e-mail to a group of users, in the exiting e-mail protocols such as Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), the e-mail server forwards the copies of this email to the receivers. Intending to deliver an e-mail to receivers A , C and D , receiver B initially sends an e-mail to the mail server S forwards the copy of the e-mail to the receiver C . In the repeatedly transmission, there exists a redundant computation which causes a significant delay. Hence, to send e-mails in the multicast system, it has to look for another efficient solution.
In 1985, the Identity-Based Cryptosystems and Signature Schemes were first proposed by Adi Shamir [11] . A novel type of cryptographic scheme was proposed to enable any pair of users to communicate securely. In 2005, McCullagh, N. [12] proposed another solution for secure e-mail with identity-based encryption. It could allow an arbitrary string of characters and numbers to serve as a public key. It had some effects in simplifying public-key encryption. In 2010, Anastasios Kihidis et.al. [13] presented a complete implementation of a practical Identity Based Encryption (IBE) infrastructure for secure e-mail communication. It attempted to simultaneously provide a fully functional and user-friendly IBE system. A packet construction mechanism using an ID-based factorial number structure (FNS) was proposed by Chen H.C. [14] , [15] , [16] for a secure system to provide a feasible solution for a secure multicast system. In 2010, Zhang M.Q. et. al. [17] presented a secure and efficient ID-based fair multi-party exchange protocol with off-line semi-trusted third party. Application of multi-receiver identity-based encryption. In 2013, Mingwu Zhang et.al. [18] proposed an efficient anonymous multi-receiver encryption scheme to achieve the security properties of confidentiality and anonymity. The anonymity of the proposed scheme could securely against outer attackers and inner attackers simultaneously, and also presented a dualanonymous multi-receiver encryption that could support the security properties such as identity privacy of both sender and receiver.
In 2013, Chen H.C. [15] proposed a secure multicast protocol for e-mail systems. A user usually needs to send an e-mail to a group of users. The proposed secure multicast protocol [15] for e-mail systems could provide perfect forward secrecy to ensure confidentiality and authentication. The protocol [15] employs the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT), RSA public key cryptosystems, and one-way hash functions. The protocol can save redundant key materials used for the e-mails. However, CRT will take a very long time in the calculation to factor for a large integer. In this paper, a secure multicast key protocol is proposed a solution to the e-mail systems for distributing a session key to the specific group. Due to the concerning for the securely transferring the session key, the proposed protocol adopts ID-based FNS [14] to replace CRT [15] is proposed. The scheme is based on ID-based FNS [14] with the hybrid cryptographic algorithms of public-key and secret-key system [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] . In the manner, not only the email construction in multicast system can be efficiently retained, but also the easy key management and fast computation [21] , [22] , [23] , [24] , [25] to process a multiple secure e-mail delivery can be proficiently achieved. The proposed protocol benefits for an excellent secure broadcast e-mail system [25] . The rest of this paper is organized as the followings, the fundamental theory of the ID-based FNS are addressed in Section 2. Two scenarios consist of corresponding schemes are proposed in Section 3. Security and complexity analyses are described in Section 4. Finally, conclusions are given in Section 5.
Fundamental Theory of the ID-based FNS
ID-based FNS [15] in a secure multicast key scheme begins with Lemma 1. 
, such that the individual positive integer can be retrieved by the equation,
where some notations are defined as followings.
The Identity numbers that are corresponding to the positive
, are presorted by decreasing order as the relations:
, …, and
As observed Theorem 1, the list of generated 
The fact of Theorem 1 can be seen in the Appendix of Ref. [15] . Let ID-based FNS be more easily readable and, therefore, Example 1 be given as below. 
is defined by Equation (1) 
Proposed Scheme
Some notations are defined and listed in Table 1 . Two scenarios and the corresponding schemes are described and designed in Section 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. The first scenario deals with that a sender sends an e-mail to one recipient. For the multicast concerning, the second scenario scopes with that a sender sends an e-mail to specific recipients.
The following notations are used to describe the security protocol and cryptographic operations in this paper. 
B A 
A symbol indicates that the certain message sent from the entity A to the entity B
Scenario I: A sender sends an e-mail to one recipient
A sender sends an e-mail to one recipient. In Fig. 1 , it shows that an e-mail is sent from sender B to receiver A, individually. There are three parts in this scenario. The first one is Pre-computation that consists steps, S1 and S2. Another one is Sending phase that describes the steps from S3 to S13. The other one is Receiving phase that illustrates the steps from S14 to S23. 1) Pre-computation
Step S1: to the e-mail server.
Note that this procedure is executed after the user i U finished receiving an e-mail. Then e-mail server arranges all the j ID where
2) Sending Phase
Step S3:
Step S4: 
Step S7: Each 
Step S8: Then set
is encrypted to be a sub-packet  by the way
Step S9: Sum up
Step S10: Compute Step S11: Construct a basic e-mail packet lock Z as the format of
Step S12: Compute a varied e-mail packet lock in bit-wise exclusive-or operation of follow:
Step S13:
. The parameter t is a timestamp at that time.
3) Receiving Phase
Step S14:
Step S15: Find the maximal sub-packet by computing
Step S16: Decrypt the set
by using the following equation:
Step S17: Find the e-mail packet lock Z
Step S18: Sum up
Step S19: Compute the j , i  's for 1 j  to 2 j  using the following equations,
Step S20: Compute the sub-packet
Step S21: Decrypt communication key
Step S22: Recover the original content message
Step S23: The 
Scenario II: A sender sends an e-mail to multiple recipients
It shows a sender sends an e-mail to multiple recipients. Fig. 2 shows that the scenario that an e-mail is sent from sender B to the multiple receivers A, C, and D. Similarly, there are three parts in this scenario. The first one is Pre-computation that consists steps, M1 and M2. Another one is Sending phase that describes the steps from M3 to M13. The other one is Receiving phase that illustrates the steps from M14 to M23. 
1) Pre-computation
Step M1:
i U TC  : g , n . Note that this step is similar to S1.
Step 
2) Sending Phase
Step M3: Step M4: 
Step M7: Each 
Step M8: Then set Step M12: Compute a varied e-mail packet lock in bit-wise exclusive-or operation of follow:
Step M13: 

. The parameter t is a timestamp at the time which the e-mail is sent form sender 1 U to his email server S .
3) Receiving Phase
Step M14:
Step M15: Find the maximal sub-packet by computing Step M17: Find the e-mail packet lock
Step M18: Sum up 

sends him messages, confined to specific authorized users. In the proposed scheme, the sender signs on a digest related to the e-mail in Step S13 and M13. The input value of the signature Y includes the sender's and receiver's identifications, the content in the email, and the timestamp t . According to the properties of a cryptographically secure one-way hash function, it is hard to reversely derive the input and find a collision. Moreover, the short-term session key is encrypted by the receiver's public key. If an adversary tries to impersonate the sender with the preceding authentication message, users can check the signature Y to discover the adversary.
Forgery Attack. The forgery attack on e-mail systems means that an adversary sends bogus message for authentication. In the proposed scheme, the sender sends the message in Step S13 and M13, which are signed on by the sender's secret key. The receiver can check the validity of the message through the sender's public key. Hence, any adversary cannot successfully engage a forgery attack in the proposed scheme.
Insider Attack. The insider attack means that malicious operators of e-mail servers can learn the short-term session key shared between the sender and the receiver. The malicious node can use the short-term session key to eavesdrop the e-mail content or send the bogus message. In the proposed scheme, the short-term session key is only known to the sender and the receiver. Even if a malicious operator of the e-mail server collects the messages transmitted between the sender and the receiver, he cannot derive the short-term session key.
Computation Complexity
The ratio of average time consumption  is defined in the known cryptographic algorithms [2] , [25] , i.e. the secret-key systems, DES, Triple DES, and AES, and publickey system, RSA. Suppose that m is the number of e-mail receivers. According to the results in [14] , the time consumption results in RSA are around 80 times of that in Triple-DES. Also, it takes the time even around 258 times slower than that in AES. Therefore, the ratio of average time consumption 1  for RSA and Triple DES equals 80, The results with the scheme in [15] is compared to the results with the proposed scheme in this paper, the comparison for the average time consumption, the number of rounds for modular operation, one-way hash function operation, XOR operation are given in Table 2 . For example, m is the number of receivers equals to 50. The result of the average time consumption in Sending Phase by using the method from the CRT-based scheme [15] equals to 4160, the other comparisons are given in Table 3 and Figure 3 . The result of the average time consumption in Receiving Phase by using the method from the CRT-based scheme equals to 240. On the contrary, the result of the average time consumption in both Sending Phase and Receiving Phase by using the proposed scheme also equals to 53, the other comparisons are given in Table 3 and Figure 3 . The other comparisons are given in Table 4, Table 5, Table 6 , Figure 4 , Figure 5 and Figure  6 . Therefore, the proposed scheme outperforms the CRT-based secure e-mail scheme [15] . The number of rounds for modular operation m+4
The number of rounds for oneway hash function operation
The number of rounds for XOR operation 0 0 1 1
Note that α is the ratio of average time consumption of the known cryptographic algorithms [14] , and m is the number of receivers, and m is the number of receivers. Note: m is the number of receivers.
In Sending Phase, the ratios of average time consumptions using 1 80
  are compared in Table 3 , and the comparison results are depicted in Fig. 3 . Fig. 3 . The ratios of average time consumptions using 1 80
  are compared in Sending Phase
In Receiving Phase, the ratios of average time consumptions using 1 80 Table 4 , and the comparison results are depicted in Fig. 4 . The scheme of previous works in [15] The proposed scheme 
  are compared in Receiving Phase
In Sending Phase, the numbers of modular operation round are compared in Table 5 , and the comparison results are depicted in Fig. 5 . The scheme of previous works in [15] The proposed scheme In Receiving Phase, the numbers of modular operation round are compared in Table  6 , and the comparison results are depicted in Fig. 6 . The scheme of previous works in [15] The proposed scheme Table 2 , the number of rounds for one-way hash function operation between both comparison schemes is same. The number of rounds for XOR operation in the proposed scheme equals one, and the number of rounds for XOR operation in the scheme of previous works in [15] equals zero. The values of the last two items in the comparison, Table 2 , are too small to be ignored.
Conclusions
In this paper, a novel secure e-mail system is proposed. The protocol is constructed by ID-based FNS Multicast mechanism with the hybrid cryptographic algorithms of publickey and secret-key system. A secure multicast key protocol is proposed a solution to the e-mail systems for distributing a session key accompanied the sent e-mail to the specific group. Due to the concerning for the securely transferring the session key, the proposed protocol adopts ID-based FNS to replace CRT is proposed. In the manner, not only the e-mail construction in multicast system can be efficiently retained, but also the easy key management and fast computation to process a multiple secure e-mail delivery can be proficiently achieved. The results with the CRT-based secure e-mail scheme is compared to the results with the proposed scheme in this paper, the comparison for the average time consumption, the number of rounds for modular operation, one-way hash function operation, XOR operation are given. According to the results of comparisons in Table 3, Table 4 , Table 5 , Table 6 , Figure 3 , Figure 4 , Figure 5 and Figure 6 , the proposed scheme outperforms the CRT-based secure e-mail scheme. 
